plakas v drinski justia

On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. 93-1431. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Id. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. at 1332. Cain left. He swore Koby would not touch him. at 1276, n. 8. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. The handcuffs were removed. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. If Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by the . 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. In the case of Plakas v. Drinski, the Federal district court in Indiana decided the use of a less lethal alternative was not required when the use of deadly force by police was justified. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. My life isn't worth anything." Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 4. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | et al. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. at 1332. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Argued Nov. 1, 1993. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Justia. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. The only test is whether what the police . 1356. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause, and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Plakas turned and faced them. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. They noticed that his clothes were wet. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. They called Plakas "Dino." Plakas often repeated these thoughts. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. This guiding principle does not fit well here. So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Mailed notice(cdh, ) Download PDF . Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. The answer is no. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." 1977). Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Hyde v. Bowman et al. (Notes) Sherrod v. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. 2d 1 (1985). It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. He fled but she caught him. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Illinois. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Plakas was turned on his back. 1988) (en banc) . 7. Plakas charged [the police officer] with the poker raised. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. He tried to avoid violence. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. The answer is no. Justia. Filing 920070312 See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. 1992). conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . 1994), and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. He moved toward her. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. The details matter here, so we recite them. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. He fled but she caught him. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. Cited 12622 times, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) | Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 85 L. Ed. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Cain left. Plakas often repeated these thoughts. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. 5. Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. 2d 772 (1996). Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. Sergeant King stood just outside it. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. He appeared to be blacking out. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. at 1276, n.8. 4th 334, 54 Cal. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. We believe the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Id. 2. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Perras took the poker. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. near:5 gun, "gun" occurs to either to She fired and missed. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. She alleges that her son was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed no serious threat to the safety of Drinski or others. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. The district Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. Sergeant King stood just outside it. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Drinski did most of the talking. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Filing 89. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 1994). Oklahoma County Board, 151 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Cir. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). ZAGEL, District Judge. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Rptr. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. United States Court of Appeals . 1985) (en banc) . This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." It is significant he never yelled about a beating. He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. . An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. 1994), in which he states: . From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. This appeal followed. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. 3. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Author: Martin A. Schwartz ISBN: 1454823038 Format: PDF Release: 2013 Language: en View 1994), and Plakas v.Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. No. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Again, he struck her. Our answer is, and has been no, because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall.

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